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to For-Proft Colleges Afect Enrollment?
Evidence from California’s Reforms
Oded Gurantz, Ryan Sakoda, and Shayak Sarkar
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n The for-profit higher education
sector expanded significantly in
the twenty-first century, but its
role remains a topic of significant
controversy due to poor student
outcomes.
n When California eliminated the
use of state aid at most for-profit
colleges in the early 2010s, many
students chose to remain enrolled
in for-profit colleges and shoulder a
larger burden of the costs.
n As significant financial penalties
do little to shift enrollment, improving
the disclosure of college quality is
also unlikely to affect where students
enroll.
n Shifting students away from
enrolling in poor-performing forprofit colleges may require stronger
policies, such as eliminating access to
federal funds.
n Government could help public
colleges become more responsive
to student demand by expanding
popular programs, as limited access
may drive students out of public
colleges and into the for-profit sector.
For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/21-356/.

T
he for-proft higher education sector expanded signifcantly in the twenty-frst
century and has become a topic of considerable controversy. Advocates for the sector

argue that the for-proft motive increases innovation and responsiveness to the market,
leading to better opportunities for students excluded from traditional higher education.
Despite these theoretical advantages, most research fnds that for-proft students have
worse labor market outcomes and higher levels of student debt, even afer accounting for
diferences in the background characteristics of who attends. Tis research has generated
concerns about the sector and catalyzed two common regulatory responses—eforts to
improve information about school “quality” and restrictions on the use of Pell Grants and
federal loans—in order to dissuade enrollment in low-quality institutions.
We examine how a policy change in California that eliminated the use of state aid to
subsidize for-proft enrollment afected student enrollment and degree attainment. We
fnd that eliminating this state aid did little to change students’ educational outcomes,
with most students choosing to remain in for-proft colleges while shouldering a larger
burden of the costs.
Our fndings suggest the following policy implications:
• Reductions in eligibility for state fnancial aid by themselves are unlikely to
dissuade students from attending for-proft colleges.
• As signifcant fnancial penalties do little to shif enrollment, improving the
disclosure of college quality—a lighter-touch approach—is also unlikely to afect
where students enroll.
• If the goal is to shif students away from enrolling in poor-performing for-proft
colleges, stronger policies, such as eliminating access to federal funds, may be
necessary.
• Additionally, government could help public colleges become more responsive to
student demand by expanding popular programs. For instance, the most common
for-proft degree in our study is for health careers, whereas California’s community
college health programs are frequently oversubscribed and can require students to
wait years before enrollment, likely pushing some students into the for-proft sector.
Our study focuses on educational outcomes but does not yet examine the implications
of for-proft enrollment on students’ fnancial health. In future work, we hope to examine
how the same fnancial aid policy afected former students’ debt and default rates for
various forms of credit, including student loans.

Background
California’s Cal Grant is the largest state aid program in the nation, with eligibility
determined by both fnancial need (income) and merit (GPA). Te Cal Grant targets
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Te Cal Grant provided
four years of full
tuition and fees at any
in-state public fouryear institution, an
annual $1,500 subsidy
for community college
enrollment, or an annual
$9,700 subsidy to attend
private colleges.

low- and middle-income students through two programs: the Entitlement grant for
“traditional” high school graduates, and the Competitive grant awarded more selectively
toward older, nontraditional students. At the time of our study, the Cal Grant provided
four years of full tuition and fees at any in-state public four-year institution, an annual
$1,500 subsidy for community college enrollment, or an annual $9,700 subsidy to attend
private colleges.
Budgetary pressures from the Great Recession and reports of for-proft colleges’
inefectiveness led California to eliminate Cal Grant eligibility at a small set of forprofts in the 2011–2012 school year and then at nearly all for-profts in 2012–2013.
Tis policy falls into one of two broad approaches typically taken by the government to
infuence college choice. Te less intensive approach is to advocate for better consumer
information, such as the U.S. Department of Education’s College Scorecard, in the hopes
that more-accessible measures of a college’s quality might induce students to avoid lowperforming schools. Alternately, the government can target low-performing institutions,
typically measured via cohort default rates, student earnings-to-debt ratios, or other
loan-repayment metrics, and restrict such institutions from accessing federal funds,
which typically leads to school closure. Prior studies have found that such sanctions
in the 1990s decreased student enrollment at targeted for-profts, and pushed Pelleligible students into neighboring community colleges (Cellini, Darolia, and Turner
2020). California’s approach is something of a middle ground, as losing state aid is more
intensive than information disclosure, but not so severe that it would lead to the college’s
closure.

How Students React to Loss of Aid at For-Profts
To study the impacts of this policy change we use individual-level data on all Cal
Grant applicants from 2007–2008 through 2012–2013, provided to us by the California
Student Aid Commission, which administers the program. We compare students who
were afected by the policy (those who listed for-proft colleges on their FAFSA fnancial
aid application before the policy took efect) to students who should not have been
afected, and how these diferences changed over time. For traditional students from high
school, we compare individuals who look observationally similar except for their FAFSA
plans, whereas for nontraditional older students, we compare individuals expressing
interest in for-profts on their FAFSA but who either did or did not qualify for the Cal
Grant based on eligibility criteria.
For nontraditional students interested in for-profts, we fnd that restricting the
use of the Cal Grant at for-proft institutions led to no change in student behaviors or
outcomes. Te lef panel of Figure 1 shows that 70 percent of students who initially
met the award criteria received and used the Cal Grant at a for-proft college before the
restrictions were enacted in 2012–2013. In contrast, about 10 percent of students who
did not initially meet the award criteria ended up receiving a Cal Grant (usually through
an appeals process) and used it at a for-proft college. When the restrictions took efect
in 2012, Cal Grant usage at for-proft colleges declined sharply, especially for the initially
eligible students. As shown in the right panel, however, actual attendance rates at forproft colleges were similar regardless of initial Cal Grant eligibility, and the two groups
of students have near-identical declines in for-proft attendance between 2011 and 2012,
when the policy went into efect.
Tus, nontraditional students’ decisions to enroll in a for-proft were almost
completely indiferent to the policy change, even though we demonstrate a dramatic loss
in state aid of roughly $10,000 per eligible student. In our paper, we also show that the
policy change had no impact on the likelihood these students earned a degree at a forproft college or anywhere else, such as at a community college.
For “traditional” recent high school graduates, we again fnd that students who lost
state aid mostly chose to enroll in for-proft colleges, though results are a bit more mixed.
We fnd suggestive evidence that the loss of aid slightly decreased the chance these
2
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Figure 1 Older “Non-Traditional” Students
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students earned a degree at a for-proft college, partly because some students shifed
into community colleges and partly because some students chose not to attend college
at all. Tese results are sensitive to reasonable changes to our model, but a conservative
interpretation is that preferences for enrollment in the for-proft sector remained strong
for both groups of students.

Some Possible Explanations
Our results show that student preferences for for-proft colleges are relatively
insensitive to a large loss in aid, especially among older, nontraditional students. Why
might this be the case? Although for-profts might ofer greater fexibility, such as a larger
selection of online courses, students who live physically closer to a community college
campus are no more likely to shif sector of enrollment. Additionally, nontraditional
students who had previously attended a community college were equally likely to shif
enrollment as those who had not, suggesting that preferences for for-profts are not likely
driven by poor prior experiences in the public sector.
Rather, the strongest potential explanation for students’ for-proft preferences are
the diferent types of degree programs ofered by for-proft and public colleges. For
instance, as shown in Figure 2, 46 percent of degrees earned at for-proft colleges by
recent high school graduates in our sample are in health professions, compared to only
4 percent of degrees earned at public colleges. Prior studies have found that California’s
public community colleges are unable to meet total demand in certain programs, such as
health care, and ofen resort to using random lotteries to allocate the limited number of
available seats (Grosz 2020).

Conclusion
We believe our results suggest several legal and policy implications. First,
policymakers should be aware of the limited efectiveness of using such state aid
restrictions to “nudge” students into alternate colleges. Students in our study lose
3

POLICY BRIEF | NOVEMBER 2021

How Does the Elimination of State Aid to For-Proft Colleges Afect Enrollment?

58

60
Health Professions
50
Percent of total degrees rewarded

Te strongest potential
explanation for students’
for-proft preferences
are the diferent types of
degree programs ofered
by for-proft and public
colleges.

Figure 2 Degree Types by Postsecondary Sector—Traditional Sample

Business; Computer/Information; Engineering Tech

46

General and Social Sciences
All Other

40

30

27

26

24

20
12
10
4

3
0

For-profit

Community and four-year colleges

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from California Student Aid Commission data.

signifcant funding but are still eligible for Pell Grants, federal loans, and other resources
that facilitate attendance. Terefore, a policy goal to shif students away from enrolling
in poor-performing for-proft colleges may require stronger policies, including
eliminating access to federal funds. Although traditional-aged students may respond to
aid restrictions by partly shifing enrollment to community colleges, our results show
impacts far smaller than those found in studies examining for-proft closures. Alternative
eforts that aim to shif student choice through increased disclosure of a college’s “quality”
are also unlikely to be efective, both because of their less intensive nature and possible
eforts on the part of colleges to game these statistics.
Te demand for for-proft education likely stems in part from the availability of degree
programs that are in high demand. However, greater degree availability at for-profts
must be tempered by serious concerns about the quality of these for-proft degrees, and
how these colleges use aggressive and ofen fraudulent advertising practices to convince
students to attend (U.S. Department of Education 2021). Policymakers interested in
infuencing student choice can help public colleges adopt the program attributes that
have given rise to such strong demand, particularly by increasing funding or removing
other barriers that prevent community colleges from expanding popular programs.
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